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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000383

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [KDEM](#) [PINR](#) [PINS](#) [PHUM](#) [IZ](#)  
SUBJECT: NEW SCIRI PARLIAMENTARIANS TALK ABOUT MOI,  
MILITIAS, AND GOVERNMENT FORMATION

REF: BAGHDAD 195

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford for  
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary. In a February 6 introductory meeting, two newly-elected SCIRI parliamentarians rejected Sunni complaints about MOI abuses and stated that Minister of Interior (SCIRI) Bayan Jabr is doing an excellent job. They added that the Shia Coalition will insist on retaining the MOI in government formation talks and reported that the Coalition is debating whether the proposed National Security Council (reftel) should have any legislative or executive authority. In addition, they claimed that Embassy's Sunni outreach efforts have gone too far, alienating many in the Shia camp. End Summary.

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SCIRI's Platform  
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¶2. (C) Abdul Kareem Al-Nakeeb said that SCIRI's political platform has not changed - security and reconstruction. Al-Nakeeb welcomed USG support in fighting the insurgency. With training and equipment, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) can fiercely patrol the Syrian and Jordanian borders. Abdul Jabar Rehaif al-Abudi told PolOffs that part of SCIRI's security platform is for militias to be integrated into the ISF. Al-Abudi said that in 2003 the Badr Organization submitted lists to CPA of Badr Corps members who were available to join the ISF. "Nothing's changed and nothing's moved forward," he said. Al-Abudi blamed PM Jaafari and MOI's administrative staff for not believing in this project, hindering the process, and letting the whole effort languish.

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MOI Abuses and the Sunnis  
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¶3. (C) Al-Nakeeb claimed that he is mystified why the USG is dissatisfied with MOI's performance. Al-Nakeeb added that if there are any MOI abuses, the USG is partially to blame since it "supervises" MOI operations. He also blamed the Sunni Arab Tawafuq Front, and in particular its leader Tariq al-Hashimi's recent accusations in the press about MOI abuses for exacerbating sectarian tension. Al-Nakeeb justified MOI random searches and raids in Sunni neighborhoods because an overwhelming evidence of weapons storehouses and bomb-making workshops exists. He claimed that the Sunnis in al-Jihad neighborhood recently blew up their own mosque when testing car bomb explosives. Al-Nakeeb said he considered "recent USG comments" (i.e., concerning the Jadriya MOI bunker Jadriya) in the press about MOI abuses to be inflammatory and premature since the

investigative report has yet to be issued. Al-Nakeeb added that the top levels of MOI management (like Adnan Thabit) were in place before long Bayan Jabr became Minister. He therefore questioned why the USG believes MOI's personnel to be sub-par.

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Suicide Bombers Should Be Executed  
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¶4. (C) Al-Nakeeb argued that the Iraqi judicial system must be more robust. The courts are inefficient and too lenient in their enforcement of justice. He gave the example of one criminal who is responsible for the deaths of 65 people. This person, al-Nakeeb lamented, is still awaiting trial. Violent criminals, such as suicide bombers, should be swiftly executed, al-Nakeeb argued.

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Government Formation  
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¶4. (C) Al-Nakeeb told PolOffs to expect the Shia Coalition to retain the MOI in government formation talks. Both al-Nakeeb and al-Abudi declined to offer MOI candidate names but stated that Bayan Jabr was doing an excellent job in the position. He added that not only is the Alliance debating who will be its PM candidate, but whether the proposed National Security Council (reftel) should have any legislative or executive authority. In his opinion, the proposed National Security Council was a ploy to allow undeserving politicians like Ayad Allawi high-level government positions. Al-Nakeeb added that the Embassy's Sunni outreach efforts had gone too far. He argued that

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the U.S. is trying to cheat the system by pushing Sunnis into positions they should not have. Al-Nakeeb reported that many Shia Alliance members feel that the USG does not respect the results of the December elections that the International Monitoring of Independent Elections (IMIE) judged free and fair.

¶5. (C) BIONOTE: Abdul Kareem Abdel Saheb Mohamed al-Nakeeb graduated from Mosul University in 1981 and then entered the military academy. A year later he became an artillery officer. From 1982-2002 al-Nakeeb spent much of his time shuttling back and forth between Kurdistan and Iran. In 1985-6 he joined the opposition with Jalal Talabani in the northern city of Qara Dagh. From 1995-1999 he remained in Iran. From 1999-2001 al-Nakeeb spent time in both Syria and Lebanon. In 2002 he returned to Dukan Kurdistan to take part in the liberation. He spent 2003 in Wasit and 2004 in Kut. Al-Nakeeb lays claim to helping establish SCIRI, in particular its media committee. Owing to his military training al-Nakeeb said he was also involved in the standing up SCIRI's military organization, the Badr Corps. His immediate family has settled in Karbala. He still has extended family in Iran.

¶6. (C) BIONOTE: Abdul Jabar Rahaif al-Abudi graduated from Baghdad University in the sciences. Like al-Nakeeb, al-Abudi has a military background and spent a similar amount of time in Kurdistan and Iran. He said that he had studied IT programming in France. Due to his military background, al-Abudi said he was heavily involved with standing up Badr Corps and plays and executive role with the organization.  
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